Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Asheim, Geir B. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Voorneveld, Max | en |
dc.contributor.author | Weibull, Jörgen W. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-02-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-07-01T08:43:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-07-01T08:43:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOslo | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aMemorandum |x2010,01 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Epistemic game theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | epistemic stability | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rationalizability | en |
dc.subject.keyword | closedness under rational behavior | en |
dc.subject.keyword | mutual p-belief | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rationales Verhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lernprozess | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Epistemically stable strategy sets | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 617789126 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.