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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46454
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| Title: | | Smooth multibidding mechanisms  |
| Authors: | | Pérez-Castrillo, David Quérou, Nicolas |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3394 |
| Abstract: | | We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired. |
| Subjects: | | mechanism design NIMBY |
| JEL: | | D78 D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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