|
EconStor >
Universität Bielefeld >
Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Universität Bielefeld >
Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Buechel, Berno | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hellmann, Tim | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-11-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-01-24T10:22:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-01-24T10:22:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13569 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce 'too dense' networks. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Inst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefeld | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 400 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D85 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Networks | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Network formation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Connections | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Game theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Externalities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Spillovers | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Stability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziales Netzwerk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Network Externalities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Under-connected and over-connected networks | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 584641079 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|