EconStor >
Universit├Ąt Bielefeld >
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University >
Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBuechel, Bernoen_US
dc.contributor.authorHellmann, Timen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:13Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13569en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760-
dc.description.abstractSince the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce 'too dense' networks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW Bielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 400en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetwork formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordConnectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordGame theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSpilloversen_US
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleUnder-connected and over-connected networksen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584641079en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
584641079.pdf317.09 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.