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Title:Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation PDF Logo
Authors:Dewenter, Ralf
Kruse, Jörn
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:DICE discussion paper 10
Abstract:This paper analyzes the impact on mobile telephony diffusion patterns of the two predominant payment regimes, calling party pays (CPP) and receiving party pays (RPP), for mobile termination services. By applying instrumental variable techniques to panel data we account for a possible interdependency of penetration rates and regulatory interventions. For this purpose we use data on political and institutional factors to instrument endogenous regulatory decisions. We conclude from our empirical analysis that there is no significant impact of either RPP or CPP on penetration rates. Therefore an application of RPP in order to obviate regulation of termination fees would be feasible.
Subjects:mobile telephony markets
calling-party-pays
mobile termination fees
endogenous regulation
JEL:L1
L5
L96
ISBN:978-3-86304-009-3
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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