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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 10
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the impact on mobile telephony diffusion patterns of the two predominant payment regimes, calling party pays (CPP) and receiving party pays (RPP), for mobile termination services. By applying instrumental variable techniques to panel data we account for a possible interdependency of penetration rates and regulatory interventions. For this purpose we use data on political and institutional factors to instrument endogenous regulatory decisions. We conclude from our empirical analysis that there is no significant impact of either RPP or CPP on penetration rates. Therefore an application of RPP in order to obviate regulation of termination fees would be feasible.
Schlagwörter: 
mobile telephony markets
calling-party-pays
mobile termination fees
endogenous regulation
JEL: 
L1
L5
L96
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-009-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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