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dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:04:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:04:24Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31362-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output. Firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from their decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers. This finding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisticated. It suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market contradicting a fundamental conjecture by Friedman (1953).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // University of California, Department of Economics 05,37en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleImitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopolyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn505122006en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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