EconStor >
Rutgers University >
Department of Economics, Rutgers University >
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:02:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:02:11Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be characterized generically, and its components give sharp predictions. Third, the features of equilibrium tax policies depend only on empirically meaningful fundamentals. Equilibrium tax schedules benefit the more numerous income groups and place the burden of taxation on income groups with fewer voters. For empirical income distributions, the features of an equilibrium tax schedule are reminiscent of Director's law of public income redistribution (Stigler [36]).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2007,06en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelH31en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNonlinear income taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral competitionhen_US
dc.subject.keywordDirector's lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordextensive zero-sum gameen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSteuertheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA positive theory of income taxationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn568265793en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
568265793.pdf487.84 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.