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Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-02-23 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T11:02:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T11:02:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be characterized generically, and its components give sharp predictions. Third, the features of equilibrium tax policies depend only on empirically meaningful fundamentals. Equilibrium tax schedules benefit the more numerous income groups and place the burden of taxation on income groups with fewer voters. For empirical income distributions, the features of an equilibrium tax schedule are reminiscent of Director's law of public income redistribution (Stigler [36]). | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJ | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2007,06 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H31 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Nonlinear income taxation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | electoral competitionh | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Director's law | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | extensive zero-sum game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensteuerpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuertheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensumverteilung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlkampf | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dynamisches Modell | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A positive theory of income taxation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 568265793 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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