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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even in the case of bleak cash-flow expectations. This hold-up benefit comes at a cost, though: firms with low asset specificity cannot always eliminate the risk of coordination failure by their banks.en_US
dc.publisherFrankfurt School of Finance & Management Frankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 117en_US
dc.titleIs there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

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