Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27881
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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-10T14:00:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-10T14:00:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009042200-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27881-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even in the case of bleak cash-flow expectations. This hold-up benefit comes at a cost, though: firms with low asset specificity cannot always eliminate the risk of coordination failure by their banks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFrankfurt School of Finance & Management|cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management|x117en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleIs there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn594628954en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:117-

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