Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25217
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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen_US
dc.contributor.authorThiele, Veikkoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-23T14:45:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-23T14:45:00Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25217-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to promote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than predicted by theory. Furthermore, optimally trading off incentive and selection issues causes a form of the Peter Principle: The less suitable agent has an inefficiently high probability of promotion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper|x2007,045en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPromotion Tournamentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPiece Ratesen_US
dc.subject.keywordHidden Characteristicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordHidden Actionen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbsverlaufen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePromotion tournaments and individual performance payen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558561349en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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