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Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25217
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schöttner, Anja | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Thiele, Veikko | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-02-19 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-23T14:45:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-23T14:45:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25217 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to promote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than predicted by theory. Furthermore, optimally trading off incentive and selection issues causes a form of the Peter Principle: The less suitable agent has an inefficiently high probability of promotion. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | SFB 649, Economic Risk Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2007,045 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Promotion Tournaments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Piece Rates | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Hidden Characteristics | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Hidden Action | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Erwerbsverlauf | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Promotion tournaments and individual performance pay | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 558561349 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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