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dc.contributor.authorTisljar, Rolfen_US
dc.description.abstractWe present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. Furthermore, we present several equilibrium refinements based on the concept of equilibrium domination to take account of beliefs off the equilibrium path. Finally, we demonstrate that the extension of the strong solution of Myerson (Econometrica, 1983) to our model is supported as an equilibrium satisfying all refinement criteria presented (in case a strong solution exists).en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2002,21en_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium refinementen_US
dc.subject.keywordinfinite signaling gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformed principalen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordperfect Bayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordprinciple of inscrutabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleMechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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