Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98992
Authors: 
He, Haoran
Villeval, Marie Claire
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8217
Abstract: 
We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.
Subjects: 
team
inequity aversion
preference aggregation
social image
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
D03
D63
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
465.25 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.