Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98971 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8264
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study exchanges between three overlapping generations with non-dynastic altruism. The middleaged choose informal care provided to their parents and education expenditures for their children. The young enjoy their education, while the old may leave a bequest to their children. Within each period the three generations play a “game” inspired by Becker's (1974, 1991) rotten kids framework, with the added features that the rotten kids turn into the altruistic parent in the next period and that parents invest in the education of their children. We show that Becker's rotten kids theorem holds for the single period game in that informal aid is set according to an efficient rule. However, education is distorted upwards. In the stationary equilibrium the levels of both transfers are inefficient: education is too large and informal aid is too low.
Schlagwörter: 
rotten kids
altruism
education
long-term care
subgame perfect equilibrium
overlapping generations
JEL: 
D1
D7
D9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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