Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98947 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8252
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
job offer
unemployment
employment
labor market
minimum wage
job acceptance
JEL: 
J3
J6
J2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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