Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98947
Authors: 
Brown, Alessio J. G.
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8252
Abstract: 
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.
Subjects: 
job offer
unemployment
employment
labor market
minimum wage
job acceptance
JEL: 
J3
J6
J2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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