Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98859 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 14-008/VI
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
Which ways and means are available for the macroeconomic and fiscal coordination and/or integration within the EMU-framework? Which are the pros and cons of these scenarios? This paper combines economic theory, empirical analysis and insights regarding EMU’s institutional history in order to come to a compromise proposal for an EMU between nationalism and federalism. We take the present status quo acts as a starting point. We describe the tension between the arguments in economic theory on policy coordination and the way contagion can be avoided. In addition we assess the practical political implementation of these arguments. We sketch concrete options for a ‘deepening of economic coordination’ in the EMU, as announced by Van Rompuy in his 2013 London speech, without moving to a full-fledged federalist EPU.
Subjects: 
history of EMU
Kronungstheorie
optimal currency area
policy coordination
contagion
EPU
social preferences
EMU’s future
JEL: 
E61
F55
G15
H77
N14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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