Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98848
Authors: 
Bujko, Matthias
Fischer, Christian
Krieger, Tim
Meierrieks, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Universität Freiburg 2014-02
Abstract: 
Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.
Subjects: 
large-scale land acquisitions
land grabbing
foreign investments
weak institutions
property rights
corruption
large-N study
JEL: 
F21
O13
Q15
Q34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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