Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98657
Authors: 
Belke, Ansgar
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ROME Discussion Paper Series 14-02
Abstract: 
This paper comments on the role of the Monetary Dialogue in the context of an evolving monetary policy. The discussion is conducted in terms of the adoption of forward guidance on interest rates by the European Central Bank (ECB), the ECB's model choice and data revision policies in inflation forecasts, its membership in the Troika, its activities as a financial supervisor, as well as regards its bond purchasing activities and the implication for ECB monetary policy stemming from Fed's envisaged exit from unconventional monetary policies. This paper also assesses on a case-by-case basis the actual exchange of information between the European Parliament (EP) and the ECB. We argue that the new ECB supervisory role has made the Monetary Dialogue exercise even more important 'now' than in 'normal' times. Still, we suggest changes, both procedural as well as regarding its focus range, to make it even more effective. In our view, the transparency/accountability issue represented by a Supervisory Board 'hosted' by ECB needs to be addressed. A crucial challenge for the Monetary Dialogue is also to assess the optimal degree of ECB transparency and accountability towards the EP, the key democratic institution.
Subjects: 
accountability
European Parliament
forward guidance
Monetary Dialogue
transparency
JEL: 
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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