Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98636
Authors: 
Wittman, Donald
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 703
Abstract: 
Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy, or something akin to a monarchy, where heredity plays a primary role. This variation allows for a comparative study of their organization. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control over church doctrine and finance. And they also induce different institutional responses. I show where screening is highly institutionalized and when the age of a person may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. I am thus able to explain what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, overtime. In a nutshell, this paper is about politics and strategic behavior in the large (democracy versus autocracy) within the context of the small (religious institutions).
Subjects: 
religious organizations
autocracy
age
organizational structure
voting strategy
JEL: 
D02
D72
Z12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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