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Gonen, Rica
Lerner, Anat
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 690-710
We analyze the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal combinatorial auctions. We examine a model with multidimensional types, nonidentical items, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation; the players are subject to publicly-known budget constraints. We show that the space includes dictatorial mechanisms and that if dictatorial mechanisms are ruled out by a natural anonymity property, then an impossibility of design is revealed. The same impossibility naturally extends to other abstract mechanisms with an arbitrary outcome set if one maintains the original assumptions of players with quasilinear utilities, public budgets and nonnegative prices.
budget constraints
Pareto efficiency
incentive compatibility
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