Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98572
Authors: 
Huang, Chen-ying
Sjöström, Tomas
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 66-88
Abstract: 
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the »-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies
Subjects: 
coalition formation
non-cooperative implementation
partition function
recursive core
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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