Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98565 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 21-37
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not follow truthful bidding strategies. We find that, ex-post, the equilibrium allocation is still efficient but may not be fair. However, on average, participants receive the same outcome they would have received if everyone had reported truthfully-i.e., the mechanism is ex-ante fair.
Schlagwörter: 
fair division
auction
JEL: 
C72
C78
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
318.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.