Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98555
Authors: 
Béal, Sylvain
Chakrabarti, Subhadip
Ghintran, Amandine
Solal, Philippe
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 338-356
Abstract: 
We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Subjects: 
partial cooperative equilibrium
supermodular games
network formation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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