Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98549
Authors: 
Servátka, Maroés
Tucker, Steven
Vadoviéc, Radovan
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 2 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 412-433
Abstract: 
This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.
Subjects: 
experimental economics
gift giving
investment game
trust
trustworthiness
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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