Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98542 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 333-354
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
Subjects: 
coordination
minority game
mixed strategy
learning models
experiments
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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