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Autor:innen: 
Ernst, Christiane
Thöni, Christian
Datum: 
2013
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 608-623
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed strategies. In contrast to the prediction under standard assumptions, bids are drawn from a bimodal distribution: very high and very low bids are much more frequent than intermediate bids. Standard risk preferences cannot account for our results. Bidding behavior is, however, consistent with the predictions of a model with reference dependent preferences as proposed by the prospect theory.
Schlagwörter: 
all-pay auction
prospect theory
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D44
D81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Dokumentart: 
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