Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98533
Authors: 
Mauleon, Ana
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 329-338
Abstract: 
We consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
Subjects: 
relative concerns
alternating-offer bargaining
private information
maximal delays
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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