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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 1-25
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.
Schlagwörter: 
game theory
reinforcement learning
adaptive procedure
revision protocol
disappointment
simulations
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