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Shachat, Jason
Swarthout, J. Todd
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 738-753
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
ultimatum bargaining
forward induction
loss avoidance
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