Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98489
Authors: 
Barelli, Paulo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 415-421
Abstract: 
We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
Subjects: 
obesity
hierarchies of conditional beliefs
epistemic conditions
common belief
correlated subgame perfect equilibrium
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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