Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98476
Authors: 
Kliemann, Lasse
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 2 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 302-332
Abstract: 
We study network formation with n players and link cost » > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on unilateral link formation and Nash equilibrium. We show existence of Nash equilibria and a price of stability of 1 + ο(1) under moderate assumptions on the adversary and n Ï 9. We prove bounds on the price of anarchy for two special adversaries: one removes a link chosen uniformly at random, while the other removes a link that causes a maximum number of player pairs to be separated. We show an Ο(1) bound on the price of anarchy for both adversaries, the constant being bounded by 15 + ο(1) and 9 + ο(1), respectively.
Subjects: 
network formation
equilibrium
price of anarchy
unilateral link formation
adversary model
network robustness
JEL: 
C72
C90
H41
J33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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