Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Zagare, Frank C.
Year of Publication: 
[Journal:] Economies [ISSN:] 2227-7099 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Volume:] 2 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 20-44
This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling's explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard's with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams' with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. The broad outlines of a more general explanation that addresses all of the foundational questions associated with the crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information are laid out.
Cuban missile crisis
game theory
threat that leaves something to chance
metagame theory
theory of moves
analytic narrative
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
486.61 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.