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Autoren: 
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
Datum: 
2014
Reihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-003
Zusammenfassung: 
Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.
Schlagwörter: 
acquisition of firms
disclosure of private information
experimental economics
JEL: 
C91
D61
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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