Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98447
Authors: 
Alberti, Federica
Conte, Anna
Tsutsui, Kei
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-002
Abstract: 
In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer´s reported beliefs about the responder´s willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer´s beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer´s beliefs is estimated. The estimated proposer´s beliefs are then compared with the actual responder´s choices. As a result of this comparison, we observe that the proposer tends to underestimate the empirical acceptance probability, especially when the slice of the pie allocated to the proposer is large.
Subjects: 
allocation game
beliefs elicitation and evaluation
model construction and estimation
JEL: 
C51
C52
C72
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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