Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98276
Authors: 
Besley, Timothy
Pande, Rohini
Rao, Vijayendra
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Center Discussion Paper 921
Abstract: 
This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.
Subjects: 
Development
Political Economy
Public Provision of Private Goods
Decentralization
JEL: 
O12
H11
H42
O20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
455.41 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.