Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98208
Authors: 
Weese, Eric
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center 1022
Abstract: 
Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.
Subjects: 
Boundaries
Mergers
Moment Inequalities
Municipalities
JEL: 
C63
D71
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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