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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2014-26
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
To solve the corruption problem, its root causes should first be diagnosed and factors supporting it should be determined. One of the important facilitators of corrupt transactions are intermediaries, who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are 'spurious' intermediaries who obtain bribes from public services by pretending they can ensure a service is completed even though they have no such influence over the issue. This deception may continue even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such a deception. From the solutions of the model, some policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring are derived.
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
spurious middlemen
game theory
JEL: 
K42
C72
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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