Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/97742 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IMFS Working Paper Series No. 36
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's suitability for the specific needs of customers. When structuring sales-force compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives.
JEL: 
D18
D83
M31
M52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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