Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/97465 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1303
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing the assumption that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modified) representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute 'reverse Bayesianism,' remain valid.
Schlagwörter: 
Awareness
unawareness
reverse Bayesianism
probabilistic sophistication
JEL: 
D8
D81
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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