Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97465
Authors: 
Karni, Edi
Vierø, Marie-Louise
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1303
Abstract: 
This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing the assumption that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modified) representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute 'reverse Bayesianism,' remain valid.
Subjects: 
Awareness
unawareness
reverse Bayesianism
probabilistic sophistication
JEL: 
D8
D81
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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