Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97357
Authors: 
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 692
Abstract: 
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.
Subjects: 
Communication
Multidimensional mechanism design
Experts
Collusion
Axiomatic bargaining
Closed rule
JEL: 
D82
C78
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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