Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97353
Authors: 
Allouch, Nizar
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 689
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium with general best-reply functions. Our uniqueness result simultaneously extends similar results in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) on the private provision of public goods to networks and Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours (2011) on games of strategic substitutes to nonlinear best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) whereby consumers are able to offset income redistributions and tax-financed government contributions. To this effect, we establish that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond regular networks.
Subjects: 
Public goods
Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Network games
Neutrality
Bonacich centrality
Main eigenvalue
JEL: 
C72
D31
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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