Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97339
Authors: 
Drouvelis, Michalis
Saporiti, Alejandro
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 710
Abstract: 
We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.
Subjects: 
Electoral competition
Power
Ideology
Uncertainty
Nash equilibrium
Experimental evidence
JEL: 
C72
C90
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.