Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97256
Authors: 
Kalai, Ehud
Shmaya, Eran
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1562
Abstract: 
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games.
Subjects: 
Anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Repeated games
Large games
Bayesian equilibrium
Price taking
Rational expectations
Anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Repeated games
Large games
Bayesian equilibrium
Price taking
Rational expectations
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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