Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/97256 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1562
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games.
Schlagwörter: 
Anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Repeated games
Large games
Bayesian equilibrium
Price taking
Rational expectations
Anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Repeated games
Large games
Bayesian equilibrium
Price taking
Rational expectations
JEL: 
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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