Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97237
Authors: 
Gradwohl, Ronen
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1561
Abstract: 
In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents' predilection for privacy and the permissible game forms.
Subjects: 
Nash implementation
subgame perfect implementation
privacy
Nash implementation
subgame perfect implementation
privacy
JEL: 
D82
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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