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Autoren: 
Blume, Andreas
Lai, Ernest K.
Lim, Wooyoung
Datum: 
2013
Reihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 490
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper formalizes Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT) as a game and implements it experimentally, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As predicted by our model and in line with Warner, the frequency of truthful responses is significantly higher with randomization than without. The model predicts that randomization weakly improves information elicitation, as measured in terms of mutual information, although, surprisingly, not always by RRT inducing truth-telling. Contrary to this prediction, randomization significantly reduces the elicited information in our experiment.
Schlagwörter: 
Randomized Response
Lying Aversion
Stigmatization Aversion
Mutual Information
Laboratory Experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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