Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97226
Authors: 
Kuzmics, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics 501
Abstract: 
Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of always pass on the left and always pass on the right are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy) equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game.
Subjects: 
incomplete information
continuously stable strategy
CSS
evolutionary stability
best-response dynamics
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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