Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97126
Authors: 
Assaad, Ragui
Krafft, Caroline
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2014/067
Abstract: 
Marriage is the single most important economic transaction and social transition in the lives of young people. Yet little is known about the economics of marriage in much of the developing world. This paper examines the economics of marriage in North Africa, where asymmetric rights in marriage create incentives for extensive up-front bargaining and detailed marriage contracts. As well as describing the limited literature on the economics of marriage in North Africa, this paper draws on economic theories of the marriage market and game-theoretic approaches to bargaining to propose a unifying framework for the economics of marriage in North Africa. New empirical evidence is presented on the economics of marriage in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, illustrating how individuals' characteristics and ability to pay shape bargaining power and marriage outcomes, including age at marriage, marriage, costs, consanguinity, and nuclear residence.
Subjects: 
economics of marriage
marriage market
marriage contract
bargaining
North Africa
age at marriage
marriage costs
consanguinity
nuclear residence
JEL: 
J12
J16
N37
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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