Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96924
Authors: 
Alipranti, Maria
Milliou, Chrysovalantou
Petrakis, Emmanuel
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 146
Abstract: 
This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition.
Subjects: 
Cournot
Bertrand
vertical relations
two-part tariffs
JEL: 
D43
L13
L14
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-145-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
230.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.