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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4767
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces compliance, but with high compliance there is incentive for lax monitoring; with less monitoring, compliance starts decreasing, and then there is an incentive to intensify monitoring. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is ex-plained by the nature of social interaction process rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. For the authority committed to a fixed auditing probability, we derive a sufficient condition for fines to be effective means of deterrence. Our analysis can be applied, among others, to crime, tax evasion, safety regulations, employment and environmental protection.
Schlagwörter: 
social interaction
compliance
random matching
behavioral rule
learning
JEL: 
C79
D83
H26
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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