Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96854
Authors: 
Blumkin, Tomer
Danziger, Leif
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4721
Abstract: 
In this paper we provide a novel justification for the use of minimum wage rules to supplement the optimal tax-and-transfer system. We demonstrate that if labor supply decisions are concentrated along the intensive margin and employment is efficiently rationed, a minimum wage rule can be socially beneficial by serving as a tagging device that targets benefits to the deserving poor, defined as low-skilled workers exhibiting a weak taste for leisure.
Subjects: 
redistribution
minimum wage
efficient rationing
JEL: 
D60
H20
H50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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